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NOTES
PROPOSAL FOR DETERMINATE
SENTENCING IN NEW YORK: THE EFFECT
ON AN OFFENDER'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
I. Introduction
The concept of indeterminacy presently provides the foundation
upon which criminal sentences are based in a majority of jurisdic-
tions.' Indeterminate sentencing reflects an underlying belief that
rehabilitation is the primary objective of the criminal law.' Indeter-
minate sentencing requires that punishment be on an individual-
ized basis.3 To meet the rehabilitative needs of the individual of-
fender, as with any physical or mental illness with which a criminal
activity is equated,' an indeterminate sentence is justified because
the time necessary to effect a cure can not be known with certainty
when the offender is first incarcerated.5 In 1870, New York enacted
1. See generally Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole
System, 16 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9 (1925); Zalman, The Rise and Fall of the Indetermi-
nate Sentence, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 45 (1977).
2. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, FAIR AND
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 73-75 (1976)(Background Paper by A. Dershowitz); ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 143 (1968); Bayley, Good Intentions
Gone Awry-A Proposal for Fundamental Change in Criminal Sentencing, 51 WASH. L. REV.
529 (1976); OR. CONST. art. I § 5 ("Laws for the punishment of crime shall be found on
the principle of reform and not of vindicative justice."). It has generally been acknowledged
that there are four basic rationales which have justified the imposition of sentence on the
offender. These rationales are (1) the deterence of crime; (2) the incapacitation of the of-
fender; (3) the vindication of the social order and; (4) the rehabilitation of the offender.
Campbell, Law of Sentencing 21-23 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
3. 337 U.S. at 247 (1949). See also United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1974);
Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143 (8th Cir. 1973) ("A mechanical approach to
sentencing plainly conflicts with the sentencing guidelines announced by the Supreme Court
in Williams v. New York.").
4. EXECUTIVE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN NEW YORK:
AN INQUIRY INTO SENTENCING AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM xii (Report to Governor Hugh
L. Carey, March, 1979) [hereinafter cited as EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING].
5. Id. at xii, 13. The Wickersham Commission, a New York State Crime Commission of
the early 1930's, advanced this argument. "Physicians, upon discovering disease, cannot
name the day upon which the patient will be healed. No more can judges intelligently set
the date of release from prison at the time of trial." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE OBSERVANCE
OF LAW AND ENFORCEMENT (The Wickersham Commission) REPORT ON PENAL INSTITUTIONS,
PROBATION AND PAROLE 142-43 (1931).
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the first indeterminate sentencing statute.' This statute provided
for the release of young offenders "at any time before they had
completed their full prison term, if it was believed that they had
been rehabilitated."7 Although a sharp departure from past sentenc-
ing practices, indeterminate sentencing quickly gained wide accept-
ance. By 1922, thirty-eight states had enacted, in one form or an-
other, limited indeterminate sentencing procedures.'
During the sentencing process significant constitutional problems
concerning the procedural due process rights of an offender often
emerge. These questions concern, among other things, the evidence
available to the sentencing judge and the right of the offender to
challenge the use of such evidence The Supreme Court has held
that the policies of an indeterminate sentencing system require that
many of the criminal offender's due process rights be subordinated
to state's interest in his rehabilitation.'0 To effectuate this state
goal, sentencing judges have therefore been granted wide discretion
to consider any relevant evidence pertaining to the defendant to
realize the state's interests. For example, the rules of evidence," the
right to confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses,'"
and the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment have been found inapplicable to the sentencing pro-
cess. 3
Recently, indeterminate sentencing has come under increasing
6. 1870 N.Y. Laws ch. 427, § 9.
7. Id.
8. Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the Demise of
Rehabilitation, 7 HOFSTA L. REV. 29, 31 (1978); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, DEFINITE
SENTENCING: AN EXAMINATION OF PROPOSALS IN FOUR STATES 5 (1976).
9. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9,12, reh. denied, 339 U.S. 926 (1950) (holding that there
are necessary and inherent differences between due process at trial and at sentencing); Wil-
liams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725
(1969).
10. 337 U.S. at 249-50.
11. FED. R. EVID § 1101(d)(3). "No limitation shall be placed on the information concern-
ing the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court
of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1970). See also United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (3d Cir.
1976); People v. Kase, 94 Misc. 2d 999, 405 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Sup Ct. N.Y. 1978).
12. 337 U.S. at 243.
13. United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983
(1971). But see Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
961 (1971).
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criticism for a number of reasons.'" Two of these criticisms are di-
rected at the results of these sentencing practices. First, vast dispar-
ities exist among sentences for offenders who have committed simi-
lar crimes. It has been argued that this disparity is the product of
uncontrolled discretion in imposing sentences. 5 Second, critics
argue that under indeterminate sentencing decisions frequently
are made behind a "veil of secrecy."'" The public does not know
whether the judge or the probation officer who prepared the present-
ence report determines the appropriate sentence nor how sentencing
decisions are made. 7 A third criticism focuses on the rationale un-
derlying indeterminate sentencing. 8 It is argued that to assess the
rehabilitative potential of the offender is either impossible or im-
practical. A final critism of indeterminate sentencing is that, as a
result of the aforementioned deficiencies, it is popularly viewed as
a principle cause in the declining public respect for the criminal
justice system. 0 The secreti'e nature of sentencing decisions have
accented disparity among sentences and have severely undermined
the integrity of the sentencing process in the eyes of the public.,
The uncertainty of punishment engendered by the disparate nature
of present practices has diminished the capacity of the law to do
justice to individuals.
Determinate sentencing seeks to avoid the pitfalls of the indeter-
minate system by limiting and structuring the actions of sentencing
14. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCING: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972); J. MITFORD, KIND
AND USUAL PUNISHMENT (1973); P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND
EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM (1977).
15. EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at x-xxi.
16. Id. at 2. The "veil of secrecy" to which the Executive Commission refers is the per-
ception on the part of the public that the identity of the government officials determining
the sentence, and the criteria which are considered, is unavailable information. These com-
plaints in their basic form represent questions as to the right to confrontation and the right
to cross-examination guaranteed by the sixth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. 6.
17. EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at xiii. See also Coffee, The
Repressed Issue of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability and Equality in the Era of the
Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975 (1978).
18. EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at xiii.
19. Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the Demise of
Rehabilitation, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 29, 32 (1978); P. O'DoNNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS,
TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM 27 (1977); EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 205-06.
20. EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at xii.
21. Id. at xiii.
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judges so as to increase the certainty of punishment."2 This end is
achieved through the use of a system of relatively fixed sanctions,
considering primarily the offense committed while taking into ac-
count the offender's prior record.13 A number of states have recently
adopted a determinate sentencing system and federal legislation is
presently before the Congress.24 In the New York State Assembly
a bill (A.8308) 25 has been introduced which proposes that a sentenc-
ing guidelines scheme similar to proposed federal legislation and the
practices of a number of states be enacted in New York.
This Note will address the issue of what procedural protections
are due an offender at sentencing, and how these rights will be
affected under a system of determinate sentencing. 2 An examina-
22. Id. at 212-13. N.Y.A. 8308 § 906(1), 202nd Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as A.8308].
23. There are four basic determinate sentencing schemes. First, flat sentencing requires
that the sentence imposed at trial constitute the term which the offender will have to serve,
less applicable good time credits. Crimes are grouped into a number of categories with a broad
sentencing range prescribed for each category. The judge may impose a "flat sentence"
anywhere within the prescribed range. Second, mandatory sentencing takes away from the
sentencing judge all possible discretion in imposing sentence. A single penalty for each crime
is established by the legislature and that is the penalty which must be meted out. Third,
presumptive sentencing envisions the legislature enlarging its penal code to include many
more degrees for each crime corresponding to the specific elements of the offense. The legisla-
ture, for each degree would establish a range of presumptive sentences thereby allowing the
sentencing judge some discretion in imposing sentence. Finally, a sentencing guidelines ap-
proach foresees the creation of a Sentencing Commission which would determine sentencing
parameters. These guidelines would be used by the sentencing judge as a benchmark from
which a sentence is imposed. A judge could impose a sentence outside the guidelines if he
felt that such a determination was warranted, but a written statement of reasons for such a
departure usually must be given. EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 214-
18.
24. California was one of the first states to adopt a determinate sentencing structure,
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, ch. 1139, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4752 (West),
as amended by the Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 165, 1977 Cal. Legis. Serv. 433 (West). Other
states which have adopted a determinate sentencing scheme include: Minnesota, Act of April
5, 1978, ch. 723, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 705 (West); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A (West 1978); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13 (1978); and Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONG.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1381-1385 (Purden 1978). There is now before the Congress legislation which
would revise the Federal Criminal Code. A shift to determinate sentencing is one of the
proposed reforms found in the bill. S. 1722, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979). Section 1722 of the
bill, if enacted, will amend Title 28 of the United States Code to establish a Sentencing
Commission to implement the change to determinate sentencing. See note 104 infra and
accompanying text.
25. A.8308, supra note 22.
26. A full discussion of the merits and deficiencies of a determinate sentencing system
will not be undertaken here. For such a discussion see generally Symposium on Sentencing,
DETERMINATE SENTENCING
tion of constitutionally permissible sentencing procedures under an
indeterminate scheme will be reviewed in part II. Part III will dis-
cuss the proposed legislation. Specifically, three proposals will be
analyzed. The first proposal shifts responsibility for the preparation
of presentence reports from probation officers to investigative court
officers. This officer is to be appointed by the chief administrative
judge.27 The second proposal establishes a sentencing hearing to
determine the existence of any aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances28 which might lead to an enhancement or reduction of the
offender's sentence .2 The proposed sentencing hearing will be con-
trasted with current indeterminate sentencing practices to assess
the continued vitality of present procedures under a new sentencing
scheme. The final proposal grants both the offender and the prose-
cutor increased access to appellate review of sentences.30
II. Constitutional Challenges to Indeterminate Sentencing
Proceedings
Constitutional challenges to sentencing practices are a recent
phenomena. 3' While offenders traditionally were accorded limited
review of sentencing procedures,32 sweeping attacks on sentencing
practices brought pursuant to the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment 3  were disfavored.3' Townsend v. Burke repre-
7 HOFSTRA L. REV. pts. I & II (1978-1979); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMI-
NAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DETERMINATE SENTENCING-REFORM OR REGRESSION (1978); Glick,
Mandatory Sentencing: The Politics of the New Criminal Justice, 43 FED. PROS. 3 (1979).
27. A.8308, supra note 22, § 75.05(8)(t)-(u), .05(9).
28. Id. § 400.10.
29. Id. § 906(10)(a)(b).
30. Id. §§ 450.12, .25, 470.07, .21.
31. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, sentencing judges were limited as to the
amount of discretion which they could exercise at sentencing. With the rise of the indetermi-
nate sentence, the discretionary powers of the sentencing judge were increased substantially
and therefore dictating greater review of the propriety of sentence. See Procedural and Sub-
stantive Fairness in Sentencing: An Unnecessary and Unappealing Subject to Pennsylvania
Higher Courts, 82 DICK. L. REV. 379, 380-81 (1978).
32. At common law, appellate review was limited to the question of whether the sentence
imposed fell within the statutory limits. Traditionally, federal appellate review was confined
to the same narrow scope. Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930); Blockburger
v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
33. The fourteenth amendment reads in part: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
34. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 738 (1948).
35. Id.
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sented a significant departure from this practice. This case involved
the conviction of a defendant on two counts of burglary and two
counts of robbery." The defendant challenged the judge's use of the
confession made without the aid of counsel and misleading allega-
tions concerning his criminal record in the determination of the
defendant's sentence." The defendant claimed that the use of sus-
pect information at sentencing ran afoul of the fourteenth amend-
ment due process requirements. 8 The Court's decision did not reach
the question as to what specific procedural rights were due a defen-
dant. Rather, it held only that elements of fair play and a desire to
have convictions rest on reliable information necessitated that the
sentence be overturned." The Court concluded that it was "the
carelessness of designed pronouncement of sentence on a foundation
so extensively and materially false, which the prisoner had no op-
portunity to correct. . . that renders the proceedings lacking in due
process.""0
Williams v. New York, i decided one year after Townsend, ignored
the due process claims upheld in Townsend. In Williams, the defen-
dant was found guilty of murder in the first degree.4" The jury rec-
ommended a life sentence, but the judge rejected this recommenda-
tion and imposed the death penalty.13 The judge made this determi-
nation on the basis of additional information not admissible at trial,
but which appeared in the presentence report." This information
consisted of alleged confessions by the defendent and allegations of
"'thirty other burglaries in and about the same vicinity' where the
murder had been committed."" Williams appealed, arguing that
36. Id.
37. Id. at 739-40.
38. Id. at 741.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
42. Id. at 242.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 244.
45. Id. The report also referred to other activities which indicated that the defendant
"possessed 'a morbid sexuality' and classified him as a 'menace to society.'" Such evidence,
while inadmissible at trial (see WIGMORE, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 1367-1368, 1377 (Chadbourn
Rev'd ed. 1974)) was considered crucial evidence for a presentence report. See FED. R. EVID.
§ 32(2), N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390 (McKinney 1975). It was argued that the purpose of the
report was to inform the sentencing judge of all information concerning the convicted person's
past life, health, habits, conduct and moral and mental propensities. 337 U.S. at 245.
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the guarantee of procedural due process requires that prejudicial
information contained in the presentence report be subjected to the
evidentiary rules applicable at trial." The Supreme Court rejected
this argument. Justice Black, writing for the majority, subordinated
the defendant's due process rights to the sentencing judge's need for
the "fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and
characteristics" in order to impose an appropriate sentence." The
majority contended:
[M]odern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more
necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain
pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules
of evidence properly applicable to the trial.
Undoubtedly the New York statutes emphasize a prevalent modern philos-
ophy of penology that punishment should fit the offender and not merely the
crime. . . .Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become impor-
tant goals of criminal jurisprudence.18
Given this commitment to individualized sentencing, a number
of justifications were advanced to curtail a defendant's procedural
due process rights during sentencing. First, the presentence report
is designed to present the sentencing judge with all possible infor-
mation concerning the defendant so that an informed rehabilitative
sentence can be meted out. The probation officer's effectiveness will
be seriously limited if the information in the report is subject, for
example, to the rules of evidence applicable at trial.' It was noted
that most of the information commonly found in the probation re-
ports would be unavailable if such information were "restricted to
that given in open court by witnessess subject to cross-
examination. '50 Second, a fear implicit in Williams, and later made
explicit by a number of courts, was the state interest in protecting
confidential sources.5 Finally, it was asserted that extensive proce-
46. 337 U.S. at 245. The defendant argued that he was denied reasonable notice of the
charges against him and was not afforded an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses who
contributed to the presentence report.
47. Id. at 247.
48. Id. at 247-48.
49. Id. at 250.
50. Id.
51. The problem of confidential sources is twofold. On the one hand there is the fear that
the disclosure of the confidential source, i.e., an informer, could endanger the physical wellbe-
ing of the confidential source. See United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215, 217 (1st Cir. 1972);
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dural safeguards would "endlessly delay criminal administration in
a retrial of collateral issues.""2
The limitations placed on due process protection in Williams were
predicated on the belief that the sentencing proceeding was deemed
to be nonadversarial. This view, however, has been modified. In
Kent v. United States,"3 a juvenile offender challenged a proceeding
conducted by the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, wher-
ein the court waived its jurisdiction over the offender and trans-
ferred him to the criminal court.5 The Supreme Court held that
such a proceeding was of such "critical import" to the juvenile that
he was entitled to the essential requirements of due process and fair
treatment.' Such requirements were held to include the right to the
effective assistance of counsel, access to information which could
have a possible impact on the deliberations of the sentencing judge,
and a statement of reasons for the decision of the trier of fact.50
While the factual distinction between the two cases seems clear,"7
much of the rationale in Kent undermines the very substance of the
Williams decision. Kent rejects the contention made in Williams
that because the proceeding at issue is characterized as non-
adversarial, the individual subject to such a proceeding should be
denied procedural process. 8 The Kent court argued that although
the Juvenile Court was designed to protect the child's welfare, the
actual effect of the system was far different. 9 The present operation
of these courts places the child in a position where he "receives the
Note, The Presentence Report: An Empirical Study of its use in the Federal Criminal Process,
58 GEo. L.J. 451, 472 (1970). Secondly, courts have expressed much concern that sources, once
disclosed will cease to cooperate. The "drying up" of confidential sources has been a subject
of much concern since Williams. United States v. Fischer, 381 F.2d 509, 512 (2d Cir. 1967).
See also People v. Peace, 18 N.Y.2d 230, 219 N.E.2d 419, 273 N.Y.S.2d 64, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1032 (1966); People v. Huff, 35 A.D.2d 1033, 316 N.Y.S.2d 384 (3d Dep't 1970); People
v. Cleary, 33 A.D.2d 814, 305 N.Y.S.2d 384 (3d Dep't 1969); Roche, Presentence Investigation
Report, 29 ALBANY L. REV. 206, 212 (1965).
52. 337 U.S. at 250.
53. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
54. Id. at 546.
55. Id. at 556-57.
56. Id. at 554. While the court in Kent extended a number of due process safeguards to
the individual, it was made clear that the hearing did not have to conform with all the
requirements of a criminal trial. Id. at 562.
57. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 542-44; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 242-43.
58. 383 U.S. at 554-56.
59. Id. at 555-56.
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worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postu-
lated for children."6
0
The "no due process" rule at sentencing enunciated in Williams
was modified further in Specht v. Patterson."' Specht brought be-
fore the Supreme Court the question whether an individual con-
victed of indecent liberties, which under Colorado *law carried a
maximum sentence of ten years, was entitled to notice and a full
hearing when sentenced under the Sex Offenders Act.62 Sentencing
under the Sex Offenders Act is predicated on a finding by the trial
court that an offender convicted of specified sex offenses "if at large,
congtitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the pub-
lic. .... ",13 An individual sentenced under the Colorado Sex Offend-
ers Act is subject to an indeterminate term of from one day to life
imprisonment." Williams was held inapplicable because the sent-
encing process under question in this case involved the determina-
tion of whether the offender constituted a "threat of bodily harm to
members of the public," a new finding of fact not an ingredient of
the offense charged." The Court held that" 'a defendant in such a
proceeding is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant protections
which due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings.'""
More recently, lower federal courts have held that as a matter of
due process hearsay evidence must be excluded from consideration
at sentencing when such evidence lacks any indicia of reliability. In
United States v. Weston,67 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the convic-
tion of a defendant for receiving, concealing and facilitating trans-
60. Id. at 556.
61. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
62. Id. at 607.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Specht court went to some lengths to distinguish the holding of Williams.
Specht argued that a sentencing proceeding under the Sex Offender's Act was completely
different than the defendant's criminal trial. While not addressing the contention that any
sentencing proceeding involves issues entirely different than a criminal trial. The court in
Specht felt justified in concluding that the nexus between the issues at trial and at sentencing
found in Williams, was not present when the state sought to senterice an individual under a
different statutory proceeding thereby mandating a result in stark contrast to the holding of
Williams.
66. 386 U.S. at 609.
67. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1971).
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portation of heroin."5 The trial judge initially imposed a minimum
mandatory sentence of five years. However, when presented with a
presentence report which alleged that the defendant was a large
scale trafficker in narcotics, the judge imposed the maximum allow-
able sentence of twenty years." The defendant appealed, disputing
the veracity of the assertions made in the presentence report and
arguing that the judge's consideration of'them without more sub-
stantiation than appeared in the presentence report violated her
fourteenth amendment rights to due process.7 0 The -court distin-
guished Williams7 and relied on Townsend v. Burke to vacate the
higher sentence. The court held that a sentence cannot be based on
information the accuracy of which is extremely suspect." "
The Ninth Circuit expanded the holding of Weston in Farrow v.
United States.7 In Farrow, a defendant, sentenced for jumping bail
and failing to pay a special tax on marijuana, moved to vacate his
sentence. Defendant argued that the sentencing court had consid-
ered four invalid prior convictions74 and had enhanced his sentence
based on allegations in the presentence report which were materially
untrue.7 5 The defendant contended that the use of false material
violated the due process commands of Townsend. While the court
denied the defendant's motion on factual grounds," with regard to
his second contention it was stated that "clear teaching of
Townsend and Weston is that a sentence will be vacated on appeal
if the challenged information is (1) false or unreliable, and (2) de-
monstrably the basis of sentence."77
The application of the exclusionary rule under the fourth amend-
68. Id. at 627.
69. Id. at 627-30.
70. Id. at 630-31.
71. Weston sought to distinguish Williams on two grounds. First, Weston vigorously de-
nied the allegations in the presentence report and the judge's consideration of them at sent-
encing, Williams did neither. Second, Williams, it was contended, involved sweeping chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of the whole sentencing process. Weston's challenge was lim-
ited to the accuracy and use of alleged unreliable material in her presentence report. Id. at
631.
72. 448 F.2d at 634.
73. 580 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1978).
74. Id. at 1344.
75. Id. at 1358.
76. Id. at 1362.
77. Id. at 1359.
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ment has worked to limit the evidence used in the sentencing pro-
cess.7" In Verdugo v. United States,7" a leading case applying the
exclusionary rule at sentencing,"0 the defendant had been convicted
of selling and transporting heroin. The sentencing judge sought to
increase the defendant's sentence on the basis of evidence which
had been suppressed at trial."' Defendant appealed, arguing that the
use of such evidence even for the limited purpose of sentencing
violated the commands of the exclusionary rule." The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the use of illegally seized evidence would be a sub-
stantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures.83
Judge Browning, in a separate opinion, made further reference to
the individual's privacy interest in removing such evidence from
consideration at sentencing.8"
No clear test has yet been developed to indicate when the of-
fender's constitutional rights have been violated to an extent suffi-
78. The exclusionary rule was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, a unanimous court held that in a federal prosecution
the fourth amendment barred the admission of evidence obtained through an illegal search
and seizure. Id. at 398. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), expanded the scope of the Weeks
rule to exclude all evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment from admission
in state court proceedings. Id. at 655. While the commands of the exclusionary rule seem
clear, there has been some conflict as to what interests are being vindicated by the rule. A
number of decisions have justified the rule on the grounds that the exclusionary rule is the
"only effective deterrent to lawless police action." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636
(1965), accord, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968)(the exclusionary rule is the "principal
mode of discouraging lawless police conduct"). Another line of decisions ground the exclusion-
ary rule in the protection of the individual's right to privacy. Dodge v. United States, 272
U.S. 530, 532 (1926)("If the search and seizure are unlawful as invading personal rights
secured by the Constitution those rights would be infringed yet further if the evidence were
allowed to be used."). The emphasis on the protection of the individual's privacy interests is
further manifested by the requirement that a violation of personal interest must be shown in
order to have standing to bring a fourth amendment challenge. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128 (1978); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1968); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367-70 (1968). See generally
Note, Application of the Exclusionary Rule at Sentencing, 57 VA. L. REv. 1255 (1971).
79. 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971). See also People v.
Belleci, 24 Cal. 3d 879, 885, 598 P.2d 473, 477, 157 Cal. Rptr. 503, 507 (1979) (evidence
suppressed at trial as illegally obtained may not be introduced at sentencing).
80. See also United States ex rel. Rivers v. Myers, 384 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1967); United
States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 579 F.2d 707
(2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Rao, 296 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
81. 402 F.2d at 608.
82. Id. at 610.
83. Id. at 611.
84. Id. at 616 (Browning, J., separate opinion).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
cient to require a departure from the tenets of Williams.5 However,
departures from Williams frequently have been predicated on the
showing of one of three factors: (1) where substantial rights may be
adversely affected as a result of the proceeding; 6 (2) where issues
not adjudicated at trial must be resolved; 7 and (3) where informa-
tion relied on in sentencing was materially untrue.8 These qualifica-
tions reflect an underlying dissatisfaction with the balance struck
in Williams between the individual's rights and the state's interests
at sentencing.8
The balance struck in other post-conviction proceedings0 illus-
trates the necessary safeguards which should be applicable to the
sentencing process." In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Supreme Court
determined that certain minimum due process protections must be
extended to an individual in a parole revocation hearing when a
85. See Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARv. L. Rev.
821 (1968). One commentator has formulated decision rules which courts arguably employ
when passing sentence. One rule is that an offender "has a relatively clear right not to be
sentenced on the basis of false information about one's past record . . . defendants have a
right not to be sentenced on the basis of nonadjudicated allegations of criminal behavior
unless the prosecution presents persuasive proof of such allegations." Project, Parole Release
Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L. J. 810, 856 n.231 (1975). United
States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285, 1293 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
86. United States v. Bierey, 588 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 927
(1979) (critical stage for sixth amendment purposes exists whenever substantial rights of the
accused may be adversely affected). Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Mempa v.
Rhay, 388 U.S. 128 (1967).
87. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Hollis v. Smith, 571 F.2d 685, 693 (2d Cir.
1978)("where a higher sentence requires the proof of a fact not established in the criminal
trial, rather than the judge's overall assessment of the defendant, the sentencing is subject
to certain due process guarantees with respect to the proof of the critical fact"); People v.
Bailey, 21 N.Y.2d 588, 596, 237 N.E.2d 205, 208, 289 N.Y.S.2d 943, 948 (1968)("an additional
finding of fact independent of the question of guilt before the indeterminate sentence can be
imposed clearly brings this case within the ambit of the Specht holding and entitles those
sentenced under the statute to a hearing"); People v. Rosello, 97 Misc. 2d 963, 412 N.Y.S.2d
975 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
88. Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1359 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. at 741; United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d at 634; Collins v. Buckhoe, 493
F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1973).
89. United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d 707 (2d
Cir. 1978).
90. Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)(prison disciplinary hearing); Gagnon v. Scar-
pelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation violations); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)(pa-
role revocation).
91. 408 U.S. at 484-89.
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"grievous loss of liberty" was threatened." Among these minimum
rights held to be due to the defendant were the right to written
notice of the charges, the disclosure of evidence upon which the
charges are based, the opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence, the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses, a "neutral and detached"
hearing body, and a written statement of the fact findings." 3 The
Court in Morrissey remanded the case to the district court to deter-
mine whether the defendants had been accorded these minimum
due process protections."4
The importance of the requirement that information used at sent-
encing be reliable is illustrated by the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correc-
tions Complex. 5 The Court in Greenholtz was asked to determine
what process is due a prisoner in a parole release hearing. " The
Court distinguished between a release and revocation of parole. 7 It
92. Id. at 479.
93. Id. at 489. These minimum requirements must be read in consonance with the Court's
conclusion that due process is a flexible concept. Id.
94. Id. at 490. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); United States v. Dockery,
447 F.2d 1178, 1190 (D.C. Cir.) (Skelly Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971). The balancing of interests analysis used in Goldberg to determine the applicability
of procedural due process guarantees in many respects can be likened to the deliberations of
the Williams court. Williams held that the state interests in an informed rehabilitative
sentence outweighed the individual offender's constitutional rights. Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. at 247-51. Williams read in this light is similiar to the Supreme Court's post-
Morrissey decision in Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Wolff, due process safe-
guards were held to be inapplicable to a prison disciplinary hearing. Id. at 561. The extension
was denied because the balance of interests within the context of a prison disciplinary pro-
ceeding "militated against adopting the full range of procedures suggested by Morrissey." Id.
The strong state interest in maintaining order and safety within the prison outweighed the
individual's right to procedural due process safeguards at a disciplinary hearing. Id. at 561-
62. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), which voided a death sentence where important
presentence materials were not disclosed to the defendant, rejected the alleged state interests
which justified non-disclosure. Id. at 358-61. The interests rejected in Gardner mirror the
interests relied on in Williams to deny the individual due process protections. The apparent
inconsistency on the part of the Supreme Court as to what state interests will justify the
curtailment of individual due process protections has led some to question the continued
validity of Williams. See note 171 infra and accompanying text.
95. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
96. Id. at 3.
97. Id. at 9. Parole revocation involves the return to prison from the outside world, of an
individual who had previously been granted a release from prison by his Parole Board. An
individual, who formerly had been free on the streets, is required to re-enter prison. Parole
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was felt that parole release involved a liberty interest too tenuous
in nature to require invocation of procedural due process require-
ments." The Court stated that the factual determinations necessary
for the revocation of parole were not present in the parole release
context." Parole release involved questions highly subjective in na-
ture which have traditionally been left to the determination of ex-
perts while parole revocation was based for the most part on
"retrospective factual questions."'" The possibility of factual error,
which has been judiciously guarded against in the revocation hear-
ing by the requirements of minimum due process, was found less
relevant in the context of a release determination. 0 1
Greenholtz modified the "grievous loss of liberty" requirement
enunciated in Morissey for the imposition of due process procedural
safeguards. The invocation of the procedural due process mandated
by Morrissey is now predicated on a showing of both a possibility
of "grievous loss of liberty" coupled with a showing that such a loss
is based on "restrospective factual questions."'' 2 After Greenholtz,
an individual must allege, inter alia, that factual matters decided
release is concerned with the return of the individual to society from prison. The parole
releases question is handled by a parole board. The determination is made by considering
the inmate's prior criminal record and his activities and achievements while incarcerated.
The Supreme Court in Greenholtz, distinguished between parole release and revocation in
the following manner:
The fallacy in respondent's position is that parole release and parole revocation are
quite different. There is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one
has in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires. The parolees in
Morrissey (and the probationer's in Gagnon) were at liberty and as such could "be
gainfully employed and (were) free to be with family and friends and to form enduring
attachments of life." 408 U.S. at 482. The inmates here, on the other hand, are con-
fined and thus subject to all of the necessary restraints that inhere in a prison.
Id. See N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 259(i)(1)-(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979) (parole release and parole
revocation, respectively).
98. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
99. Id.
100. An example of a "retrospective factual question" according to the court was the
determination "whether the parole in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of
parole and whether the parolee should be recommitted either for his or society's benefit." Id.
at 9.
101. Id.
102. Id. Justice Marshall, writing for the dissenters, argues that the majority's fixation
on the "retrospective factual determination" requirement may have added a second element
to the requirements for due process protections under Morrissey. The dissenters contended
that the Morrissey holding should not be limited to instances where only objective, factual
determinations are being made. Id. at 27-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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at a proceeding have a strong potential for being unreliable. 3
The recent trend in most courts has been to expand the proce-
dural safeguards due an offender during the sentencing process.
Whether this trend will continue with a shift to determinate sent-
encing is an open question. One of the aims of determinate sentenc-
ing is to replace the subjective sentencing decisions made under
present practices, with objective factual determinations. Although
Greenholtz curtails the offender's constitutional right to due pro-
cess, the factual determinations which will govern the proposed
sentencing procedures for New York will require extensive proce-
dural due process protections for an offender subject to a determi-
nate sentencing hearing.
III. The Proposed Determinate Sentencing Legislation
New York, following the initiative taken on both the federal and
state levels, has proposed that a sentencing guidelines approach be
adopted by the state legislature. o0 Under the proposed legislation, 105
a sentencing commission will be established, consisting of appoint-
ees of the Governor, the State Senate and Assembly and by the
administrative board of the courts.'" s The sentencing guidelines es-
103. Under a system of indeterminate sentencing the decision process required before
sentence can be imposed bears a strong resemblence to the "purely subjective appraisals by
the Board members based on their experience with the difficult and sensitive task of evaluat-
ing the advisability of parole release." Greenholtz, id. at 10. See Kadish, The Advocate and
the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REv. 803, 812-13 (1961)
("Determining when during the offender's term he shall be released approximates the judicial
setting of the term of imprisonment. The only difference is the time of determination.").
104. States operating under the sentencing guidelines model, include Minnesota, 1978
Minn. Laws ch. 723, Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1381-1385 (Purdon 1978); and
proposed legislation in Virginia, Virginia Sen. Bill 180 (1978). See note 24 supra and accompa-
nying text.
105. A.8308, supra note 22.
106. Id. § 902(2)-(4). The bill not only attempts to balance the influence which each
branch of the government will be able to exert on the commission, it further seeks to limit
the ability of special interests to affect the commission's decisionmaking.
The members of the commission appointed by the administrative board of the courts
shall be active trial judges of the state. The members of the commission appointed by
the governor shall be one district attorney of this state, one public defender or legal
aid attorney of this state and one individual with substantial experience and expertise
in the field of criminal justice, no more than two of whom shall belong to the same
political party. The members of the commission appointed by the temporary president
of the senate, the speaker of the assembly and jointly by both shall be individuals with
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tablished by the Sentencing Commission will be determined by two
factors: the magnitude of the offense and the prior criminal back-
ground of the offender.0 7 The proposed sentencing system for New
York, like other determinate systems throughout the country, pro-
vides the sentencing judge with discretion to enhance or reduce
sentences where certain aggravating or mitigating circumstances
are proven. 08 Such circumstances will be proven at the sentencing
hearing for the offender.'"1 The State Executive Commission on
Sentencing characterized the guidelines approach as a "middle
course between the inflexibility of mandatory or presumptive sent-
ences and the virtually unfettered judicial discretion which marks
indeterminate .. .sentencing."1 0
The proposed legislation also recommends revision of the proce-
dures for designating and sentencing persistent felons."' A determi-
substantial experience and expertise in the field of criminal justice, no more than two
of whom shall belong to the same political party.
Id. § 902(3).
107. Id. § 906(1).
108. Id. § 907(10)(a)(b). The proposed legislation in New York also differs from other
commission/guideline models in that its vests the Sentencing Commission with complete
discretion to determine what would constitute an aggravating or mitigating circumstance.
A.8308 further deviates from other commission guideline formulas by prescribing that an
enhancement which would accompany a determination that an aggravating circumstances
exists could bring the offenders to the upper limit of the maximum sentence allowed by the
law. In the case of a mitigating circumstance the converse is true.
109. Id. §§ 400.10(4), .10(5).
110. EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 221-22. See notes 15-17
supra.
111. A.8308, supra note 22, §§ 70.08, .10, 400.16, .20 (1979). The legislation reads in part:
§ 400.16 Procedure for determining whether defendant is a persistent violent felony
offender.
1. Applicability. The provisions of this section govern the procedure that must be
followed in any case where it appears that a defendant who stands convicted of a
violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of the penal law,
and may be a persistent violent felony offender as defined in section 70.08 of the penal
law.
2. Statement; preliminary examination; hearing; subsequent use of predicate vio-
lent felony conviction finding. The requirements set forth in subdivisions two and three
of section 400.15 of this article with respect to the statement to be filed, preliminary
examination, hearing and subsequent use of a predicate violent felony conviction find-
ing in the case of a second violent felony offender, shall also apply to a determination
of whether a defendant has been subjected to two or more violent predicate felony
convictions and is a persistent violent felony offender.
§ 400.20 Procedure for determining whether defendant should be sentenced as a per-
sistent felony offender.
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nation that an offender is a persistent felon will result in a substan-
tially increased sentence." 2 This determination, made after the of-
fender's criminal trial, is based on the types of offenses and the
number of times that the offender has committed the offenses."13
Three basic reforms are proposed by A.8308. First, the legislation
seeks to amend existing procedures employed in preparing the pre-
sentence report which constitutes the primary source of information
for the sentencing hearing."' It is proposed that responsibility for
the preparation of these reports be shifted from probation officers
to investigative court officers. The investigative officers will be ap-
pointed by the chief administrative judge and will be responsible to
the court."15 Second, the legislation establishes a sentencing hearing
to determine the existence of any aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances."' Finally, the legislation proposes to amend certain statu-
tory provisions, thereby extending to both the offender and the pros-
1. Applicability. The provisions of this section govern the procedure that must be
followed in order to impose sentence as a persistent felony offender. Such sentence may
not be imposed unless, based upon evidence in the record of a hearing held pursuant
to this section, the court:
(a) Has found that the defendant is a persistent felony offender as defined in subdivi-
sion one of section 70.10 of the penal law, and
(b) Is of the opinion that the history and character of the defendant and the nature
and circumstances of his criminal conduct are such that extended incarceration of the
defendant is warranted to best serve the public interest.
2. Authorization for hearing. When information available to the court prior to
sentencing indicates that the defendant is a persistent felony offender, and when, in
the opinion of the court, the available information shows that a persistent felony
offender sentence may be warranted, the court may order a hearing to determine:
(a) Whether the defendant is in fact a persistent felony offender, and
(b) If so, whether a persistent felony offender sentence should be imposed.
5. Burden and standard of proof; evidence. Upon any hearing held pursuant to this
section the burden of proof is upon the people. A finding that the defendant is a
persistent felony offender, as defined in subdivision one of section 70.10 of the penal
law, must be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence admissible
under the rules applicable to the trial of the issue of guilt. Matters pertaining to the
defendant's history and character and the nature and circumstances of his criminal
conduct may be established by any relevant evidence, not legally privileged, regardless
of admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, and the standard of proof
with respect to such matters shall be a preponderance of the evidence.
112. A.8308, supra note 22, § 70.08(2) (persistent violent felony offender); § 70.10(2) (per-
sistent felony offenders).
113. Id. §§ 70.08(1)(a)-(b), .10(1)(a)-(b).
114. Id. § 390.10(1)(c)-(f).
115. Id. § 75.05(8)(t)-(u). EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at S-6.
116. A.8308, supra note 22,.§ 400.10(4)-(5).
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ecutor for greater access to appellate courts than is available under
present law."' It is important to assess the aforementioned proposed
changes in New York's sentencing structure in light of the constitu-
tional protections guaranteed to convicted defendants.
A. The Proposed Role of Investigative Court Officers
The proposal to shift responsibility for the preparation of present-
ence reports from probation officers to investigative court officers is
a radical departure from present practices. At present, the proba-
tion officer is responsible to a local probation department office. The
officer's role is to offer the court guidance in determining the reha-
bilitative needs of the offender; to this end, any relevant material
may be submitted to the court."' In contrast, the investigative court
officer is responsible to the court and is directed to provide the court
with information objectively describing the circumstances of the
offense."' Neither the proposed legislation nor the memorandum
attached to the legislation make explicit the rationale for depriving
the probation department of responsibility for compiling and draft-
117. Id. §§ 450.12, .25, 470.07, .21.
118. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.20 (McKinney 1976). The presentence report con-
tains information concerning the offender's prior criminal record, employment record, a de-
scription of the circumstances surrounding the offense, and information concerning the of-
fender's social, moral and psychological propensities. Probation officers are also responsible
for policing probationers under his charge. N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 255, 256(a)(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1979)(section 255 concerns probation in the City of New York).
119. Investigative court officers will conduct presentence investigations and also prepare
the report. A.8308, supra note 22, § 75.05(8). The proposed legislation also suggests an appro-
priate scope for presentence reports. Id. § 390.30(1)(c)-(e):
§ 390.30 Scope of presentence report:
1. In felony cases the pre-sentence report shall set forth:
(a) The circumstances attending the commission of the offense;
(b) The defendant's history of delinquency or criminality, including any certificates
of conviction where available;
(c) A description of the normative sentence applicable to the particular defendant;
(d) Information relating to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, as specified
by the commission on sentencing guidelines, which may warrant enhancement or
reduction of the normative sentence and asserted by the parties, and the source from
which such information was obtained;
(e) Information relating to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, as specified
by the commission, which may warrant enhancement or reduction of the normative
sentence, although not asserted by the parties, and the source from which such infor-
mation was obtained;
(f) Information relating to any other aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
may justify the imposition of a sentence outside of the sentencing guidelines.
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ing the presentence report. The Executive Commission's Report
provides two possible justifications. First, it notes that probation
departments throughout the state were overworked. 0 By removing
the burden of preparing presentence reports, the Executive Com-
mission posits that probation officers would be able to more ade-
quately perform what is considered their proper function: to provide
social services to probationers."2 ' Second, it is felt that given the
critical importance of the presentence report, the individual who
prepared the report should be entirely accountable to the Court.2 2
At the time the Williams case was decided, disclosure of informa-
tion in a presentence report was left to the discretion of the sentenc-
ing judge.2 3 In most instances, this meant nondisclosure to the of-
fender.' This policy was based on several factors. First, it was
presumed that disclosure of the report would impair the report's
rehabilitative function.2 5 Second, it was contended that the non-
adversarial relationship nurtured by the probation officer with the
offender would deteriorate if the offender knew that his probation
120. EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 54.
121. Id. at S-7.
122. Id. at S-6. See note 119 supra. The accountability requirement to a large extent
represents an underlying dissatisfaction with the present quality of presentence reports. The
Executive Commission on Sentencing cited with approval a study of the New York City
Probation Department which concluded that even though there were "'almost 200 profes-
sional staff engaged full time in making presentence investigations and reports,' the reports
were found to be redundant, repetitive and often irrelevant to the sentencing decision to be
made." EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 54 (quoting from ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL PROBATION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
PROBATION 43 (1977)). While there is no clear reason for the proposed shift, the argument can
be made that the prime motivation for the accountability requirement is the belief that
probation officers are not doing a proper job. If the problem was perceived to be a question
of overworked probation officers the solution would be to hire more staff, not to go out and
create a new system to perform the same function. An implication to draw from the
"accountability requirement" is that the former practice of treating the relationship between
probation officer and offender as non-adversarial may no longer be viable. See notes 46-50
supra and accompanying text.
123. 337 U.S. at 245. For other due process challenges to the validity of sentencing prac-
tices see People v. Perry, 36 N.Y.2d 114, 324 N.E.2d 878, 365 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1975); People v.
Peace, 18 N.Y.2d 230, 219 N.E.2d 419, 273 N.Y.S.2d 64, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1966);
People v. Butler, 54 A.D.2d 56, 387 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1976).
124. See United States v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C. 1960); People v. Peace, 18
N.Y.2d 230, 219 N.E.2d 419, 273 N.Y.S.2d 64, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1966).
125. 337 U.S. at 249; Roche, The Position for Confidentiality of the Presentence Report,
29 ALBANY L. REV. 206, 221-22 (1965). But see Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (Stevens,
J., plurality opinion) (rejecting the contention in the capital punishment context).
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officer took part in his sentencing. 2 ' Third, it was argued that proce-
dural due process safeguards would interfere with the probation
officer's expert evaluations. 7
These claims lose much of their validity when examined in light
of a determinate sentencing system. Determinate sentencing rejects
the position that the purpose of sentencing is to rehabilitate the
offender. Therefore, considerations necessary for rehabilitation are
of no consequence to a determinate system."8 Determinate sentenc-
ing also rejects the notion that the sentencing process is non-
adversarial. While present practices exhibit a more informed regard
for the needs of the offender, the present relationship between the
probation officer and the offender is still characterized as non-
adversarial.' 2 ' This view is inapplicable to a determinate sentencing
system. Finally, t he investigative court officer, although expected to
be a competent individual, will have no claim to the alleged exper-
tise necessary to make informed decisions.3 0 Guarantees of the fifth
126. 337 U.S. at 249. See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text.
127. Commonwealth v. Burton, 301 A.2d 675, 677, 451 Pa. 12, 15 (1973). An interesting
decision which discusses some of the implications of greater presentence reports vis-a-vis the
extension of greater due process safeguards to an offender is People v. Brant, 83 Misc. 2d 888,
373 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup. Ct. 1975). See also United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652,
660 (5th Cir. 1974)(Tuttle, J., dissenting in part); Bertrand v. United States, 467 F.2d 901
(5th Cir. 1972).
128. See notes 19 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
129. Under current practices disclosure to a defendant of the contents of his presentence
report is encouraged. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 390.50 (McKinney 1976); FED. R. CriM.
PROC. § 32(c)(1)-(2) (1970); ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND
PROCEDURES 4.4 (Approved Draft, 1968).
130. While the state can no longer assert its interest in the rehabilitation of the offender
to justify the denial of important due process protections, this does not mean that the state
no longer has an interest in sentencing. Aside from the concerns which have led to the
proposal of A.8308, the state still has an important stake in the protection of confidential
sources. While the state may argue that the extension of due process safeguards to the
individual may destroy both the potential sources of information and endanger the safety of
informants the current practices in a number of courts do not support this viewpoint. See 58
GEO. L.J. 451, 472 (1970); Higgins, Confidentiality of Presentence Reports, 28 ALBANY L. REV.
12, 30-32 (1965). The problem of confidential sources "drying up," see note 51 supra and ac-
companying text, to a large degree depends on the scope of the presentence report. A report
which is limited to such factors as prior arrests, convictions, and prior prison records or
other governmental information would not cause sources to "dry up." On the other hand, a
report broad in scope which relied on hearsay allegations, may find some sources drying up
with disclosure. The Executive Commission on Sentencing irged that the presentence report
be limited in scope. EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at S-7. A. 8308, while
limiting what factors may be considered in establishing categories of defendants, A.8308,
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and sixth amendment hitherto denied to offenders in the prepara-
tion of presentence reports may now, due to the changed nature of
the proceeding, become enforceable. Given the diminishing state
interest in non-disclosure, complete disclosure of the sentencing
report should be accorded to the offender.
B. Sentencing Hearing on Aggravating or Mitigating
Circumstances
The sentencing hearing envisioned under the proposed legislation
would be used primarily to determine the existence of any aggravat-
ing or mitigating circumstances. A finding of either circumstance
will allow the sentencing judge to enhance or reduce the sentence
established under the guidelines.' 3 The prime source of information
to be used at this sentencing hearing will be the presentence re-
port.' 3 Therefore, a finding that either aggravating or mitigating
circumstances exist could have a substantial impact on the of-
fender's sentence.'33 Enhancement of the sentence, or even a failure
to reduce the sentence, constitutes a "loss of substantial liberty"
which, under Morrissey, would give rise to the requirement of proce-
dural due process protections for the offender.'34 In addition, the
finding of either an aggravating or mitigating circumstance involves
a factual determination which falls within the "retrospective factual
determination" requirement of Greenholtz . 31
This position is supported by Supreme Court decisions in the
supra note 22, § 907(9)(a)-(c), is open ended as to what limits if any apply to the formation
of presentence reports. Id. § 390.30(1)(c)-(f). The Supreme Court'has hinted that when an
informer's information goes to a critical substantive determination as opposed to a procedural
decision, the balance of interests between the individual's right to a proper defense and the
public's interest in the protection of confidential sources of information may tip the balance
in favor of the individual. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).
131. A.8308, supra note 22, § 400.10 (1979). An enhanced sentence would qualify as a
"grievious loss of liberty" which the Supreme Court looked for in Morrissey to determine
whether or not due process protections should be required for a particular hearing. The
enhanced sentence is no different than parole revocation in its effect on the offender; both
procedures could result in a substantially longer prison term. United States v. Fatico, 441 F.
Supp. 1285, 1293 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
132. A.8308, supra note 22, § 390.30.
133. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
134. 408 U.S. at 481-82. See notes 92-94 supra and accompanying text.
135. The proposed legislation specifically refers to "any material facts in controversy" as
grounds for convening a hearing to determine the existence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. A.8308, supra note 22, § 400.10(1).
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sentencing context." 6 First, some procedural protections are re-
quired during the sentencing process because of the "critical nature
of sentencing in a criminal case."'37 This rule3' is applicable to the
sentencing hearing on aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The
possibility of a greatly enhanced sentence which may result from a
finding that an aggravating circumstance exists constitutes a situa-
tion of a "critical nature" to an offender. 3 Second, due process
safeguards have been applied when the post-conviction hearing in-
volves the resolution of issues "collateral" to those adjudicatedat
trial.4 ' The sentencing hearing proposed in the legislation will in-
volve such collateral issues. "' An example of a "collateral issue"
which might be used to enhance an offender's sentence is helpful to
illustrate the potential threat to the individual's constitutional
rights. Assume that A is on trial for stabbing V with a knife. At
trial, the district attorney introduces evidence which indicates that
A stabbed V with a knife once in the stomach. A is convicted under
New York law for assault in the first degree."' In the presentence
report, it is alleged that A also stabbed V seven other times in the
arms and legs. Based on this allegation, the district attorney would
seek to enhance the offender's sentence. In effect, the defendant
risks being "convicted" of additional assaultive acts, and given a
consecutive sentence therefore.
136. See notes 85-88 supra and accompanying text.
137. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
138. United States v. Bierney, 588 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 927
(1979) ("critical stage for Sixth amendment purposes exists whenever substantial rights of
the accused may be adversely affected").
139. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966);
Commonwealth v. Stukes, 435 P. 535, 541, 257 A.2d 828, 831 (1969) (critical stage in the
criminal process is defined as a situation "where legal rights may be preserved or lost, or
where some factual or legal disadvantage may be suffered by the accused").
140. See notes 61-66 & 87 supra and accompanying text.
141. United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966)(deter-
mining what procedures must be employed when sentencing under a Sex Offender statute):
It is a separate criminal proceeding which may be invoked after conviction of one of
the specified crimes. Petitioner was therefore entitled to a full judicial hearing before
the magnified sentence was imposed. At such a hearing the requirements of due process
cannot be satisfied by partial or niggardly procedural protections. A defendant in such
a proceeding is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant protections which due
process guarantees in state criminal proceedings.
See also, Hollis v. Smith, 571 F.2d 685, 693 (2d Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Stachulak v.
Coughlin, 520 P.2d 931, 935 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1975).
142. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 1975).
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1. Burden of Proof
In a criminal trial, evidence must be proven "beyond a reasonable
doubt.""' 3 Current sentencing procedures require that allegations
concerning the defendant's character and history be proven by a
"preponderance of the evidence.""' These standards of proof are
comparable with those applied at the hearing to determine whether
the offender will be sentenced as a persistent felon. At that hearing,
allegations concerning the crime must be proven beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, while issues pertaining to the offender's character and
history, and circumstances surrounding his criminal conduct, re-
quire a lower standard, i.e., that all evidence not legally privileged
is admissible.'45 A new' standard of proof is introduced by the pro-
posed legislation as to issues presented at the sentencing hearing.
Under A.8308, aggravating or mitigating circuiistances must be
proven by "clear weight of the evidence.""' This compromise posi-
tion between the two traditional standards will not adequately pro-
tect the defendant's due process rights at sentencing."7 Moreover,
confusion will certainly result from the myriad standards which
will have become applicable to the process of trial and sentencing.
2. Confrontation and Cross-Examination
The Supreme Court has referred in a number of contexts to the
rights of confrontation and cross-examination as fundamental at-
tributes of a fair proceeding." 8 It is recognized that the rights to
143. Id. § 25.
144. A.8308, supra note 22, § 400.20(5).
145. Id. § 400.20(5).
146. Id. § 400.10(5).
147. Id. § 400.20(5) (1978). The "preponderance of evidence" standard appears wholly
inapplicable to the determination as to the existence of either aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970) held that the "reasonable doubt
standard" was an essential element of due process. The possible "grievious loss of liberty"
which might accompany a determination of guilt in a criminal proceeding justified the more
exacting standard for proof of facts in issue. Id. at 364. When making determinations under
a sex offender statute, the Seventh Circuit has required the use of the "reasonable doubt
standard." United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931, 935-36 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1975). Given the similarities between the proposed presentence hearing
on aggravating and mitigating circumstances and a proceeding under a sex offender statute,
the "reasonable doubt" standard should control.
148. The Supreme Court in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) stated:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of
these is that where government action seriously injures an individual, and the reasona-
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confront and cross-examine witnesses is not absolute, because com-
peting state interests in some instances demand a curtailment of
these rights.' A significant and substantial denial of these rights,
however, will call into question the "ultimate integrity of the fact
finding process."'' 0 In Williams, the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses was denied because the exercise of these
rights were found incompatible with the process of making an in-
formed and appropriate sentencing determination.' 5' Because the
nature of the sentencing process established by A.8308 differs in
nature from the one involved in Williams, the offender is given a
limited right to counsel, and a conditional right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses.'
3. Hearsay Evidence
The rules against the admissibility of hearsay evidence do not
stand on the same grounds as the right to confrontation. 3 The rules
bleness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Govern-
ment's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show
that it is untrue . . . .We have formalized these protections in the requirements of
confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression
in the Sixth Amendment which provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall
enjoy the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This Court has been
zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases
• ..but also in all types of cases where administrative and regulatory actions were
under scrutiny.
Id. at 496-97 (citations omitted).
149. 337 U.S. at 248-51.
150. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 US. 284, 295 (1973).
151. 337 U.S. at 248, characterized the sentencing process as being non-adversarial and
rehabilitative in outlook. See notes 45-50 supra and accompanying text.
152. Under A.8308, an offender is granted the right to counsel and the conditional right
of his counsel to cross-examine adverse witnesses. A.8308, supra note 22, § 400.10(4). The
extension of these rights runs contrary to the characterization of the sentencing process as
non-adversarial. See note 151 supra and accompanying text. Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102,
124, 150 N.W.2d 146, 156 (1967)("cross-examination is in its essence an adversary proceed-
ing"). United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1192-94 (D.C. Cir.) (Skelly Wright, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
153. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970). Mr. Justice White speaking for the
majority stated:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause
are generally designed to protect similiar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest
that the overlap is complete and the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than
a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically
at common law.
DETERMINATE SENTENCING
against hearsay are intended to protect and promote the reliability
of evidence.'54 Under the Williams rationale, hearsay rules are sus-
pended because of the need of sentencing judges to have, at their
disposal, as much evidence as possible concerning the offender.,55
Countervailing the danger inherent in the use of hearsay evidence,
the Court asserted, is the fact that probation officers are skilled
investigators 5 and are able to differentiate between reliable and
unreliable information." 7 The most fertile source of unreliable, un-
corroborated evidence in the proposed presentence report will be the
allegations used to show the existence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. While the Executive Commission's Report specifi-
cally states that, under the proposed legislation, the speculative
information formerly admissible in sentencing determinations is to
be excluded, 5 ' no mechanism or procedures are'proposed to insure
the exclusion of such evidence. To insure the greater reliability of
the evidence used at the hearing, hearsay evidence should be inad-
missible in the presentence report. Reliability would foster similiar
punishment for essentially similar offenses and offenders. Greater
consistency, in turn, would nurture greater public support for the
sentencing process. Requiring a hearing to determine the presence
of aggravating or mitigating circumstances to conform with the pre-
vailing rules of evidence is wholly congruent with policy objectives
underlying determinate sentencing.'58
154. See J. WIGMORE, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 1361-1365 (Chadbourn Rev'd ed. 1974);
MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE 244-46, 583-84 (2d ed. 1972); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and
the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REV. 177, 185-86 (1948); Dallas County
v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
155. 337 U.S. at 249-50. See also Prellwitz v. Berg, 578 F.2d 190, 192 (7th Cir. 1978);
Gelfuso v. Bell, 590 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Myers,
222 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
156. 337 U.S. at 249.
157, Id.
158. As pointed out in the EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 4,
the presentence investigation should be concerned primarily with information relating to the
offender's criminal history and facts relating to the offense. Id. at S-7. This information is
obtained from court records, prison records and official police records; sources usually ac-
corded a high degree of reliability. Id. at 223, S-7.
159. It should be noted that under the determinate sentencing scheme now in operation
in California, hearsay evidence is not admissible at such a hearing, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1204
(1977). See Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers
Game, 9 PAC. L.J. 5, 39-40 (1978). Illinois by judicial decision has excluded hearsay evidence
from consideration at sentencing. See People v. O'Riordan, 21 111. App. 2d 309, 157 N.E.2d
19801 ° 653
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C. Appellate Review
At common law, appellate review was limited to the question of
whether the sentence imposed fell within the statutory limits.'
Traditionally, federal appellate review was confined to the same
narrow scope.'' This practice presumed that when a sentencing
judge determined a sentence, he employed his practical experiences
accumulated through years of sentencing offenders.'62
Under the proposed legislation, the prosecutor is, for the first
time, given a right to appeal a sentence,"3 and the offender's right
to appeal, enunciated in Townsend v. Burke, is codified.6 4 Support-
ers of increased appellate review contend that such a mechanism
will decrease unjustified disparity in sentences and foster a more
uniform application of sentencing guidelines.' More importantly,
the increase of the offender's right of appellate review represents a
more practical awareness of, and concern for, the abuses which can
occur at sentencing' and the grave harm potentially caused by
780 (1959). Accord, People v. Williamson, 69 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 383 N.E.2d 240 (1979); People
v. Kennedy, 66 I1. App. 3d 35, 383 N.E.2d 255 (1978); People v. Cowherd, 63 111. App. 3d
229, 380 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
160. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
161. Gurera v. United States, 40 F. 2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S.
386, 393 (1958)(the Supreme Court refused "to enter the domain of the penology, ... [and
the] tantalizing aspect of it, the proper apportionment of punishment").
162. See Project, Apelate Review of Sentencing Procedures, 74 YALE L.J. 379, 386 (1964).
It has been argued that the prior practice of non-review encouraged sentencing judges to
pronounce sentence without articulating any reasons for the sentence. The refusal to state
grounds for imposing sentence fostered inaccuracy and in many instances outright bias on
the part of the sentencing judge. P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D, CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST
AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM 58 (1977).
163. A.8308, supra note 22, §§ 450.12, .25, 470.07, .21 (1979). See note 32 supra and
accompanying text. The right of prosecutorial appeal appears in S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 3721-3725 (1979). Minnesota also provides for prosectorial appeals. 1978 Minn. Laws ch.
723. The legislation allows a defendant a forty-five day grace period after the imposition of
sentence in which to file an appeal, a prosecutor is only given thirty days in which to effect
an appeal. A.8308, supra note 22, § 470.21. The Supreme Court has held that prosecutorial
appeals of sentences do not violate the double jeopardy clause of the seventh amendment.
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342 (1975). Accord, United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S.
358 (1975); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711 (1969).
164. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. at 741 (offender's right to be sentenced on a reliable
and fair basis); accord, Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd. on other
grounds, 360 U.S. 1 (1959). See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
165. EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at xxiv, 237.
166. 334 U.S. 736 (1948); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1971).
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such abuses.
Attendant to a greater right to appellate review, of course, is the
frequently cited detriment of extensive delay in the sentencing pro-
cess. While increased appellate review will obviously not burden the
sentencing courts, there exists the likelihood of overcrowding at the
appellate level." 7 At the sentencing stage there is little, if any, disin-
centive to the offender to pursue any and all rights of appellate
reAew.'1s A second problem associated with appellate review is the
difficulty in reviewing discretionary sentencing decisions. The Exec-
utive Commission on Sentencing, noting the deficiencies of appel-
late review of sentences, comments that because the sentencing
decision is the "product of unstructured judicial discretion, rather
than formalized legal criteria, the appellate court is deprived of
workable standards by which to review the appropriateness of a
sentence.""' To alleviate this problem, the proposed legislation re-
quires a written statement of reasons from the sentencing judge
explaining a finding as to the existence of either aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. 70 Although the written statement ad-
dresses a problem which has hampered effective appellate review of
sentences, the confusion created by the proposed legislation as to
what procedures and evidentiary rules are applicable at sentencing
may present the same "unstructured judicial discretion" problems
found under indeterminate sentencing. Clearly delineated proce-
dures and rules applicable to the sentencing hearing should be
established to guarantee an effective right of appellate review. The
existence of such procedures and rules would help reduce the exces-
sive due process challenges now facing the courts.
167. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 36 (1973). See Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the
National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969).
168. The cases in New York and on the federal level are legion. The following cases are a
brief sampling of New York opinions concerning presentence reports and whether they should
be disclosed to the defendant as a matter of due process. People v. Huff, 35 A.D.2d 1033, 316
N.Y.S.2d 816 (3d Dep't 1970); People v. Wiesner, 34 A.D. 2d 1048,312 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dep't
1970); People v. Cleary, 33 A.D.2d 814, 305 N.Y.S.2d 384 (3d Dep't 1969); People v. Brant,
83 Misc. 2d 888, 373 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup. Ct. 1975); People v. Gagliardi, 57 Misc. 2d 929, 293
N.Y.S.2d 961 (Sup. Ct. 1968). There have been considerably less appeals taken with the
reform of N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 390.50 (McKinney 1976).
169. EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 76.
170. A.8308, supra note 22, § 400.10(4).
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D. The Analogy to Parole Revocation
It has been argued by one court that the procedures applicable to
a parole revocation proceeding should apply at sentencing.'' Pres-
ently, New York provides for a two-step hearing process to deter-
mine whether or not parole will be revoked.' The first step in effect
is a probable cause hearing to determine whether a parole violation
occurred.' The second step, that of the formal revocation hearing,
provides the alleged violator with detailed procedural safeguards,h' m
While the proposed sentencing legislation explicitly sets forth some
procedural protections to be observed at the sentencing hearing,'75
little guidance is provided as to the applicability of other procedural
due process rights. These rights include the right against self-
incrimination in the presentence report and, possibly, the right to
a jury trial, which are present in similar proceedings conducted by
the state.' If the balance between individual and state interests
calls for the extension of significant due process safeguards at one
proceeding, individuals subject to the proposed sentencing hearing
should be accorded the protections found in analogous proceed-
ings. 177
171. United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285, 1293-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d
707 (2d Cir. 1978).
172. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259(i) (McKinney 1979).
173. Id. §§ 259(i)(3)(a)(i)-(iii), 259 (i)(3)(6).
174. Id. § 259(i)(3)(c)(i)-(vi). At the revocation hearing, the alleged violator is accorded
the right to counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence in his
defense. Id. § 259 (i)(3)(c)(v)-(vi). The preponderance of evidence standard applies to the
resolution of factual questions, but the statute is silent as to what rules of evidence apply.
People ex rel. Wallace v. State, 417 N.Y.S.2d 531 (4th Dep't 1979) (allowing the use of
hearsay testimony when witness could not be located). See People ex rel. Menechino v.
Warden, Greenhaven State Prison, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 382, 267 N.E.2d 238, 241, 318 N.Y.S. 2d
449, 453 (1971); People ex rel. Newcomb v. Metz, 64 A.D.2d 219, 409 N.Y.S.2d 554 (3d Dep't
1978).
175. A.8308, supra note 22, § 400.10(4) provides that at the sentencing hearing testimony
must be taken under oath and the offender is granted a conditional right to call or cross-
examine witnesses. The statute further provides that the proceeding must be recorded and a
transcript be made part of the presentence report.
176. A.8308 is conspiciously silent on the question as to what rules of evidence apply, and
whether fourth amendment protections are relevant at the hearing.
177. Reliance on other proceedings, where the individual has similiar interests at stake,
i.e., parole revocation and sentencing as either a persistent or violent felony offender, may
present questions as to whether the procedures proposed for the sentencing hearing violate
the individual's equal protection rights secured by the fourteenth amendment. See Hollis v.
Smith, 571 F.2d 685, 692 n.7 (2d Cir. 1978).
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IV. Conclusion
Under the current system of indeterminate sentencing, the trans-
formation of the sentencing hearing into something akin to a second
trial has been consistently rejected. Courts have justified the denial
of significant due process at sentencing on two bases. First, the
extension of such safeguards would interfere with the rehabilitative
process. 78 Second, the sentencing proceeding is essentially non-
adversarial in nature. 7 A determinate sentencing scheme rejects
the underlying rationale for the denial of due process to the individ-
ual. Determinate sentencing, in many respects, is the product of a
widely held notion that the non-adversarial, remedial approach to
sentencing does not work.18
The proposed determinate sentencing procedure for New York
grants the offender the right to a hearing, to a written record of the
proceeding, to receive a written statement by the sentencing judge
as to his reason for imposing sentence, to a conditional right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to a conditional right
to present witnesses on his own behalf and to appellate review of the
sentence.'8' While the application of these entitlements accords the
offender greater protection, the proposed legislation fails to provide
the offender with the full panoply of rights applicable at a criminal
trial.
In light of the policy shift toward determinate sentencing, a num-
ber of changes in sentencing practices is recommended. First, evi-
dence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment should be
excluded from consideration at a sentencing hearing. 8 The exclu-
sion of such evidence will insure that the individual's sentence will
not be enhanced by evidence which was inadmissible at his trial.
Second, the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination
should be accorded to offenders when being examined for the pre-
sentence report.' Under the proposed legislation for New York,
the presentence report is no longer prepared in a non-adversial
178. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 2-5 supra and accompanying text.
180. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
181. A.8308, supra note 22, § 400.10.
182. See notes 78-84 supra and accompanying text.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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context; "4 therefore, rules applicable to an adversarial relationship
should apply to any interview between the offender and the investi-
gative court officer responsible for the report's preparation. Third,
the rules governing the use of hearsay evidence applicable at the
offender's criminal trial should apply at the sentencing hearing pro-
posed by the bill. Under indeterminate sentencing, hearsay evi-
dence was used because of the trust that was placed in the probation
officer who gathered the evidence.1"' The proposal to shift responsi-
bility for the preparation of the presentence report from the proba-
tion officer to the investigative court officer is an implicit rejection
of this trust."' Fourth, the standard of proof required at a sentencing
hearing should conform to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard used at a criminal trial. This standard should apply uniformly
to all determinations made at sentencing. 7 The uniform applica-
tion of this standard will guarantee the offender an essential ele-
ment of due process 88 and will obviate confusion as to what stan-
dards of proof are applicable within the sentencing context. This,
in turn, will increase the effectiveness of appellate review of sent-
ences. 18' Finally, the offender should be granted the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses at a sentencing hearing. The determi-
nations made at a sentencing hearing are likely to have a grievous
effect on an offender's liberty interest."10 Therefore, these determi-
nations should be governed by rules which not only protect the due
process rights of the offender but also guarantee the integrity of the
state's fact-finding process.
John D. Winter
184. See notes 119.30 supra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
186. See notes 120-22 supra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 143-47 supra and accompanying text.
188. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).
189. See notes 162-67 supra and accompanying text.
190. See notes 143-52 supra and accompanying text.
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